Two experiments are presented that explore online counterfactual processing in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) using eye-tracking. Participants' eye movements were tracked while they read factual and counterfactual sentences in an anomaly detection task. In Experiment 1, the sentences depicted everyday counterfactual situations (e.g., If Joanne had remembered her umbrella, her hair would have been dry/wet when she arrived home). Sentences in Experiment 2 depicted counterfactual versions of real world events (e.g., If the Titanic had not hit an iceberg, it would have survived/sunk along with all the passengers). Results from both experiments suggest that counterfactual understanding is undiminished in adults with ASD. In fact, participants with ASD were faster than Typically Developing (TD) participants to detect anomalies within realistic, discourse-based counterfactuals (Experiment 1). Detection was comparable for TD and ASD groups when understanding could be grounded in knowledge about reality (Experiment 2), though the 2 groups used subtly different strategies for responding to and recovering from counterfactual inconsistent words. These data argue against general difficulties in global coherence and complex integration in ASD.
Our tendency to undo events in the past and imagine "what might have been" is an example of engaging in counterfactual reasoning (e.g., "if only I had woken up on time, I would have made it to my job interview"), which can help to avoid making similar mistakes in the future (e.g., avoiding oversleeping by setting an extra alarm). Understanding counterfactual statements arguably requires the comprehender to hold two mental representations-one of the implied "real world" (where I did not wake up on time and missed my job interview) and one of the counterfactual, imagined world (where I did wake up on time and made it to my job interview; Mental Model Theory; Byrne & Tasso, 1999; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) . Indeed, on this view, to represent the counterfactual consequent (that I did make it to my job interview), it is necessary to inhibit the representation of the real world (that I did not wake up on time and missed my job interview; see Byrne, 2016) .
Although the cognitive basis of counterfactual processing has only recently been investigated empirically, evidence has been largely supportive of the Mental Model Theory (for reviews, see Ferguson, in press; Kulakova & Nieuwland, 2016b) . For example, see also Ferguson, Sanford, & Leuthold, 2008 , Experiment 1) tested counterfactual processing using an eye-tracked anomaly detection reading task. Previous research has established that when readers encounter a word that is anomalous with the sentence context, they make longer fixations on that word and more regressions back, compared with when the word is congruent with the sentence context (e.g., Braze, Shankweiler, Ni, & Palumbo, 2002; Ni, Fodor, Crain, & Shankweiler, 1998; Rayner, Warren, Juhasz, & Liversedge, 2004 ). This shows that readers are sensitive to discourse-level inconsistencies in text. presented participants with factual and counterfactual scenarios across two sentences. The first sentence established the context as either factual (e.g., "If cats are hungry . . .") or counterfactual (e.g., "If cats were vegetarians . . ."), and the second sentence presented a hypothetical event that was either consistent or inconsistent with the context, dependent on a critical word (e.g., feeding a cat a bowl of fish vs. carrots). Thus, scenarios were fully crossed to describe either real world inconsistent, real world consistent, counterfactual world inconsistent, or counterfactual world consistent, events. Results showed that readers rapidly accommodated the novel counterfactual world, spending longer reading critical words that were inconsistent with the described counterfactual world and taking longer to go past this region (as they tried to make sense of the anomaly) than when critical words were consistent with the counterfactual world. Nonetheless, counterfactual world inconsistencies were detected slower than factual world inconsistencies, because readers had to inhibit real-world knowledge before they could detect counterfactual inconsistencies (as Mental Model Theory would predict). An interesting find was that in an event-related brain potentials (ERPs) study, Nieuwland and Martin (2012) observed comparable anomaly detection brain responses within factual and counterfactual contexts, suggesting that factual knowledge does not always disrupt counterfactual processing.
Experiments subsequent to have used diverse methods, such as RTs, eye-tracking, and ERPs. These studies have found subtle differences in the time course that neurotypical adults process different types of counterfactual sentences, from those sentences that describe everyday events (de Vega & Urrutia, 2012; de Vega, Urrutia, & Riffo, 2007; Ferguson, 2012; Ferguson & Cane, 2015) to those sentences that describe surreal events Nieuwland, 2013) . It is possible that these differences are because of the different types of counterfactual being tested. For example, processing counterfactuals may be less cognitively effortful when they describe plausible alternatives to reality (e.g., counterfactuals about everyday events) compared with counterfactuals that depict novel scenarios (e.g., counterfactuals about nonrealistic events). Indeed, in production studies people are more likely to produce "close to fact" counterfactuals, and do not tend to create reality violating alternatives (e.g., Lewis, 1973; McMullen & Markman, 2002; Seeleu, Seeleu, Wells, & Windschitl, 1995) . Furthermore, the methods used in previous research differ in terms of how language comprehension progresses; eye-tracking allows text to be presented at once, thus reading is more natural. However, ERPs are typically recorded via word-by-word presentation, meaning that readers cannot revisit earlier parts of the text to resolve difficulties. The current study fills a gap in the literature on counterfactual processing by presenting two experiments that examined different types of counterfactual structures, but using a common (eye-tracking) methodology, which allows accurate comparison of effects across experiments.
The current study also fills a gap in the study of developmental disorders, because it investigates counterfactual processing among adults with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), in comparison with ageand IQ-matched neurotypical adults. ASD is a developmental disorder diagnosed on the basis of behavioral difficulties with socialcommunication, and a restricted and repetitive repertoire of behaviors and interests (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) . At the cognitive level, people with ASD manifest impairments in executive functioning (Adams & Jarrold, 2012; Williams & Jarrold, 2013) and the ability to imagine novel scenarios (Lind & Williams, 2012; Lind, Williams, Bowler, & Peel, 2014) . It would be important to know whether counterfactual processing is also impaired in this disorder, because counterfactual thoughts are pervasive in adult mental life and play an integral role in higher-level cognition. A recent ERP study on a neurotypical sample has shown that individual differences in social skills play an important part in establishing counterfactual worlds and linking them with real world knowledge online (Kulakova & Nieuwland, 2016a ). However, very little work has explored this directly, using rigorous methods in a clinical sample. What little research that exists has focused on children or adolescents with ASD, and examined biases in counterfactual thinking, with mixed results. For example, Scott, Baron-Cohen, and Leslie (1999) found that, relative to Typically Developing (TD) children, children with ASD were unimpaired in their ability to respond to syllogistic reasoning questions based on counterfactual reasoning (e.g., "All cats bark. Rex is a cat. Does Rex bark?"). However, the ASD group's performance became significantly impaired when they were instructed to create a picture of the story in their mind; in contrast, this instruction enhanced performance among the TD children. This may suggest that counterfactual processing is impaired in ASD only when demands on imagination are high. More recently, Morsanyi and Handley (2012) found impairments in counterfactual reasoning within a fantasy context among adolescents with ASD. Specifically, Morsanyi and Handley found that TD adolescents benefitted from the presentation of contrary-tofact statements in a fantasy context, whereas adolescents with autism did not. These difficulties in ASD could be the result of an underlying difficulty disengaging from real world knowledge, among other reasons (discussed below). However, drawing firm conclusions from the existing research on counterfactual processing in ASD is not possible, because the literature is limited in several respects.
First, all previous studies have focused on a narrow age-group of children/adolescents. However, ASD is a lifelong developmental disorder and, therefore, it is not clear whether the observed differences and difficulties in processing counterfactual sentences in childhood persist into adulthood, or whether the development of counterfactual processing ability is merely delayed in ASD. Second, the majority of previous research in this area has focused on the production of counterfactual statements (Begeer, Terwogt, Lunenburg, & Stegge, 2009) , or has required explicit responses to an investigator's questions (e.g., Leevers & Harris, 2000; Peterson & Bowler, 2000) . This is problematic because it combines ambiguous task demands and social interaction with an unfamiliar experimenter, which may lead to deficits among participants with ASD on experimental tasks not because of difficulties processing counterfactuals per se, but because of extraneous task demands on social interaction and inference. Alternatively, it may be that people with ASD (adults and/or children) have difficulties with generating counterfactuals, but not with comprehending them. Finally, all previous studies of counterfactual processing in ASD have used "offline," response-based, methods that do not assess the real-time processing of counterfactual information, and are, therefore, not sensitive to subtle preferences or delays in factual/counterfactual processing.
To address these gaps in the literature, the two experiments reported here used online eye-tracking methods to explore the comprehension of counterfactual statements in adults with ASD during natural reading. Eye movements during reading provide an excellent online tool to test real-time processing of counterfactuals, because eye movement data can be examined using a variety of spatially and temporally sensitive measures, allowing identification of exactly where in the sentence difficulties emerge. Crucially, eye-tracking measures have been integral to psycholinguistic research for over 30 years (see Rayner, 1998 Rayner, , 2009 , meaning that a great deal is known about different eye movement patterns and the aspects of language processing that they represent.
In Experiment 1, participants with and without ASD were presented with hypothetical (but realistic) counterfactual scenarios (as used in Ferguson, 2012 ) in an anomaly detection task. Participants read sentences that described everyday counterfactual events (e.g., "If Joanne had remembered her umbrella, her hair would have been dry/wet when she arrived at work"), where the critical word (underlined in the example) was consistent or inconsistent with the counterfactual context. Crucially, these counterfactuals involved a minimal change from reality (i.e., they did not violate real-world knowledge), and comprehension could be supported by participants' everyday experiences, which places relatively low demands on inhibitory control and imagination. Passages depicting factual versions of events (using "Because") were also included as a baseline measure of contextual integration. Our central predictions in Experiment 1 were as follows. Because the materials map directly onto people's real-life experiences and do not alter existing knowledge of the real-world, we did not expect to observe between-groups differences (i.e., a significant effect of Group) in the detection of contextually anomalous critical words within the counterfactual sentences. Rather, we predicted that both TD and ASD participants would detect inconsistent This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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words in factual and counterfactual scenarios to an equivalent extent. However, we predicted that both groups would experience more reading disruption for inconsistent words within factual scenarios than counterfactual scenarios (replicating Ferguson, 2012; Ferguson & Cane, 2015) , because the implied factual version of events within a counterfactual context would be activated alongside the counterfactual event. In other words, we expected to observe a Context ϫ Consistency interaction, reflecting a larger difference in reading times for consistent versus inconsistent conditions within a factual than counterfactual context.
Experiment 1 Method
Participants. Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the University of Kent Psychology Research Ethics Committee. Twenty-five adults with ASD (18 men) and 25 age-, sex-, and IQmatched TD adults took part (see Table 1 ), all of whom gave written, informed consent before participating. IQ was assessed in all participants using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) . Participants in the ASD group had all received formal diagnoses of autistic disorder (n ϭ 6), Asperger's Syndrome (n ϭ 18), or Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not-Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS; n ϭ 1), according to or International Statistical Classification of criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; World Health Organization, 1993) , and diagnostic reports were verified by the researcher. Current ASD features were assessed in 22 of the 25 participants in the ASD group by a trained, research-reliable assessor using the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-Generic (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000) .
All participants completed the Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001 ), a 50-item self-report questionnaire that assesses ASD/ASD-like features. Mean scores for the AQ in each group are shown in Table 1 . All participants were over the age of 18 and none had diagnoses of dyslexia or intellectual disability. All participants reported English as their native language. Participants in the TD group did not report any current psychiatric diagnoses.
Materials.
Anomaly detection reading task. Sentences were modified from Ferguson (2012) , as in (1) below. Thirty-two experimental items were created, each with four conditions (counterfactual consistent, counterfactual inconsistent, factual consistent, and factual inconsistent). Each item consisted of a single sentence, where the antecedent in the first clause introduced a factual ("Because . . .") or a realistic counterfactual ("If . . .") scenario, and the consequent in the second clause described an event, where the critical word was either consistent or inconsistent with the preceding context. All scenarios described physical state events (e.g., wet/dry hair) to eliminate any possible confound associated with group differences in mental state processing. Critical words were matched across conditions for length, written frequency (using the MRC Psycholinguistics Database; Wilson, 1988) , and semantic relatedness with the preceding context (using Latent Semantic Analysis; Landauer & Dumais, 1997) .
1 Experimental items were also pretested for cloze probability and critical word plausibility. Cloze probability was tested by a total of 48 students from the University of Kent using an online questionnaire platform (Qualtrics). Items were presented one at a time, truncated before the critical word, and participants were instructed to complete the sentence with the first sensible word coming to mind. Cloze probability was computed as the percentage of trials that elicited the intended consistent or inconsistent critical words, and the analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted allowing generalization to items. Participants were significantly less likely to complete sentences with inconsistent (M ϭ 1%) critical words than sentences with consistent critical words (M ϭ 56%; F(1, 31) ϭ 164.1, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .84), and context (counterfactual vs. factual) did not modulate this difference (F ϭ 1.42).
Critical word plausibility was assessed by a different set of 84 students from the University of Kent using Qualtrics. Items were presented in full, and participants were asked to rate the plausibility of each sentence using a 5-point sliding scale from Ϫ2 (highly implausible) to 2 (highly plausible). The ANOVA was conducted by items. Sentences containing inconsistent critical words were rated as significantly less plausible (M ϭ Ϫ1.46) than sentences containing consistent words (M ϭ 1.46; F(1, 31) ϭ 2046.9, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .99), and this effect was larger within a factual (Ϫ1.50 vs. 1.56) than counterfactual (Ϫ1.42 vs. 1.36) context (F(1, 31) ϭ 10.8, p Ͻ .005, p 2 ϭ .26).
Four presentation lists were created, with each list containing 32 experimental items, eight in each of the four conditions. Sentences from Experiments 1 and 2 (a total of 64 sentences) were randomly interleaved with each other and an additional 64 filler items. These filler items were all single sentences and did not contain any anomalies, or conditional structures. Half described everyday events (e.g., "Hubert was fanatical about soap operas and never missed an episode") and half described general knowledge facts (e.g., "New York is a big city, it has lots of taxis and restaurants"). This created a random order such that each participant only saw each experimental sentence once, in one of the four conditions. Participants were randomly assigned to read each list. All sentences were presented over two lines of text, with one blank line in between. The critical word 1 There was a nonsignificant trend for longer words in inconsistent compared with consistent conditions (6.34 vs. 5.63), F(1, 124) ϭ 2.90, p ϭ .091, p 2 ϭ .02, and marginally lower log Kucera and Frances written frequency scores in inconsistent compared with consistent conditions (1.48 vs. 1.74), F(1, 122) ϭ 3.52, p ϭ .063, p 2 ϭ .03. Therefore, word length and word frequency were included as random factors in the eye-tracking analyses on the critical word to control for any such differences across conditions. No differences were found in semantic relatedness, F ϭ .5, p ϭ .5. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
was never the first or last word in a line, and appeared in the same position across all conditions. Comprehension questions followed half of the experimental (i.e., 16 each for Experiments 1 and 2) and filler (i.e., 32) trials. Inhibitory control task. The Stroop task (Stroop, 1935 ) was used as a measure of individuals' inhibitory control. It consisted of 50 incongruent trials, 50 congruent trials, and 50 noncolor word neutral trials. Responses were recorded using a five-button serial response box. Interference scores were calculated by subtracting RTs on the neutral trials from incongruent trials. RTs under 200 ms or greater than 2.5 SDs from each participants' mean RT were removed as outliers. Results showed marginally impaired inhibitory control in the ASD versus TD group (91 vs. 61 ms; see Table 1 ).
Imagination task. The scene construction task described by Hassabis, Kumaran, and Maguire (2007) , and used by Lind et al. (2014) among individuals with ASD, was used as a measure of imagination. Participants were asked to imagine three vivid scenes in their mind's eye and describe them out loud. Participants completed a questionnaire after each description to report their experiences in the task, including difficulty, vividness of the scene, and so forth. The recordings of the descriptions were transcribed and blind coded by the first author for the number of people and objects mentioned; sensory descriptions; spatial descriptions; and thoughts, emotions and actions described. The third author also coded 10% of the transcriptions to check reliability of coding and interrater reliability was found to be good with intraclass correlation of .89, F(14, 14) ϭ 11.42, p Ͻ .001. Scores from the descriptions and questionnaires were then combined as described in Hassabis et al. to provide an index of imagination (an "experiential index score"), with higher scores indicating greater imagination ability. Results showed significantly impaired imagination in the ASD versus TD group (34.7 vs. 40.8; see Table 1 ).
Procedure. For the anomaly detection reading task, participants' gaze location and movement from their dominant eye was recorded using an EyeLink 1000 Plus eye-tracker (viewing was binocular). All sentences were presented in size 20 Arial font style on a VDU screen, 60 cm from the participants' eyes. Before the experiment, the procedure was explained and participants were instructed to read at their normal rate. Participants were seated at the eye-tracker and a chin rest was used to stabilize participants' head position. The eye-tracker was calibrated using a 9-point procedure. Before each sentence, participants performed a drift correction using a central fixation point. Once this calibration check was completed accurately, the experimenter advanced the screen to display the next item. Adjustments to the calibration were made whenever necessary. After reading each sentence, participants clicked a button on the mouse that either led to the presentation of a comprehension question (after 50% of trials) or the next trial.
The entire testing procedure took approximately 2 hr to complete, and participants always completed the eye-tracking task first. The AQ, WASI, Imagination, and Stroop tasks were subsequently completed in a randomized order. Participants with ASD returned on a separate occasion to take part in the ADOS. Testing took place in a quiet research lab at the University of Kent.
Results

Methods of analysis.
The experimental passages were divided into three regions for analysis. The consistent or inconsistent critical word was always presented midsentence:
An automatic procedure pooled fixations shorter than 80 ms with larger adjacent fixations, excluded fixations shorter than 40 ms that were not within three characters of another fixation and truncated fixations longer than 1,200 ms. A baseline comparison of global eye movement data across all trials revealed that TD and ASD groups did not differ in average fixation duration (208 vs. 213 ms, p ϭ .53), number of fixations per sentence (19.0 vs. 19.9, p ϭ .51), or saccade amplitude (3.02°vs. 3.0°, p ϭ .83); thus, we can be confident that there were no sampling differences between the two groups.
Two early measures of language processing are reported. First-pass reading time is the sum of the duration of fixations made on first entering a region of text until an eye-movement exits the region to either the left or right. Regression path is the sum duration of all fixations from first entering a region on the left, to exiting the region on the right (this includes any initial regressions back to previous regions). These early measures provide an indication of the difficulty experienced when participants initially process a region of text. We also analyzed one later measure. Total reading time is the sum duration of all fixations made within a region and provides an indication of the overall amount of time spent processing text in that region. Mean reading times were computed for each measure in each of the three regions for all four conditions in each group (see Table 2 ). Note. ASD ϭ autism spectrum disorder; TD ϭ typically developing.
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For transparency, the full data sets for both experiments are available on the Open Science Framework web pages (see osf.io/kw8sx). The eye movement data was log-transformed and analyzed separately for each region and measure using the lmer function in the lme4 package (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015 ) using R (version 3.3.2, R Core Team, 2016 . Each model included fixed effects of Group, Context, and Consistency, with the two levels of each fixed effect deviation coded (Ϫ.5 vs. .5) to ensure they could be directly compared. In addition, given group differences in imagination and inhibitory control (marginal) these values were centered and entered into the model as continuous fixed effects to ensure that any effects of group were a result of ASD. Models included the maximal random effects structure, including random effects for participants and items, crossed random slopes for Group, Context and Consistency and random slopes for imagination and inhibitory control within items, and crossed random slopes for Context and Consistency within participants (as suggested by Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013) . In addition, analyses on the critical word included continuous predictors of word length and word frequency. Random effects were only removed where they lead to nonconvergence because of overparameterization. Statistical effects from these models are shown in Table 3 ( Figure 1 ).
First-pass reading time. As expected, given the difference in length between counterfactual and factual contexts (e.g., "her hair would have been" vs. "her hair was"), a significant main effect of context was found in the precritical region, with longer first-pass reading times for counterfactual compared with factual sentences. In addition, first-pass reading times on the critical word were modulated by individual differences in Imagination, showing that participants with higher imagination scores had longer first-pass reading times in these regions.
The Consistency ϫ Group interaction was significant on the critical word region. Follow-up analyses revealed that, for TD participants, there was no significant difference in first-pass reading times whether the critical word was consistent or inconsistent with the sentence context, Est. ϭ .016, SE ϭ .012, t ϭ 1.28, p ϭ .2. However, the ASD group showed marginally longer first-pass reading times when the critical word was inconsistent with the sentence context relative to when it was consistent, Est. ϭ Ϫ.025, SE ϭ .014, t ϭ Ϫ1.86, p ϭ .063.
Finally, there was a significant Context ϫ Consistency interaction in the postcritical region. Follow-up analyses showed that within a factual context first-pass reading times were marginally longer following an inconsistent critical word than a consistent critical word, Est. ϭ Ϫ.032, SE ϭ .018, t ϭ Ϫ1.8, p ϭ .08. However, within a counterfactual context first-pass reading times did not differ between consistent and inconsistent conditions, Est. ϭ .027, SE ϭ .02, t ϭ 1.32, p ϭ .19. Following an inconsistent critical word, first-pass reading times were marginally longer in a factual than counterfactual context, Est. ϭ Ϫ.041, SE ϭ .021, t ϭ 1.97, p ϭ .058, but did not differ following a consistent critical word, Est. ϭ Ϫ.021, SE ϭ .017, t ϭ Ϫ1.24, p ϭ .22.
Regression path reading time. Similar to the first-pass reading time measure, a significant effect of Context in the precritical region showed that participants took longer to move past this region for counterfactual sentences compared with factual, because of length differences between context conditions. Individual differences in Imagination had a significant effect on regression path reading times in the precritical and critical regions, reflecting the same positive Table 2 Mean ( 831 (514) 898 (610) 703 (417) 821 (664) 941 (573) 948 (606) 798 (520) 841 (568) Regression path reading time (ms) 1,009 (813) 1,098 (920) 815 (547) 868 (671) 1,003 (635) 1,077 (698) 867 (549) 929 ( Critical region First-pass reading time (ms) 243 (109) 248 (116) 226 (89) 260 (187) 251 (104) 241 (99) 246 (120) 237 (94) Regression path reading time (ms) 579 (915) 625 (807) 450 (525) 579 (711) 494 (810) 471 (839) 358 (268) 384 (332) Total reading time (ms) 357 (253) 423 (363) 350 (234) 455 (351) 327 (195) 345 (237) 301 (164) 367 (273) Postcritical region First-pass reading time (ms) 396 (256) 390 (258) 366 (244) 420 (281) 429 (279) 399 (282) 418 (267) 452 ( 558 (428) 616 (504) 556 (416) 688 (421) 557 (385) 578 (420) 509 (336) 647 (441) Note.
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correlation between imagination scores and reading time as seen in the first-pass reading time measure. Group had a significant effect on reading times in the critical region, because of significantly longer regression path times in the ASD versus TD group. Moreover, Group interacted significantly with Consistency in this critical region. Similar to the pattern seen in first-pass reading times, no difference was found in regression path times for TD participants whether the critical word was consistent or inconsistent with the sentence context, Est. ϭ .009, SE ϭ .022, t ϭ .41, p ϭ .68. However, the ASD group showed significantly longer regression path times on the critical word when it was inconsistent compared with consistent with the context, Est. ϭ Ϫ.064, SE ϭ .025, t ϭ Ϫ2.57, p Ͻ .05.
Finally, a significant effect of Consistency in the postcritical region revealed longer regression path times for inconsistent versus consistent words. A simultaneous interaction between Context and Consistency revealed that this effect of consistency held within both contexts, though was larger following a factual, Est. ϭ Ϫ.184, SE ϭ .025, t ϭ Ϫ7.22, p Ͻ .001, than counterfactual context, Est. ϭ Ϫ.115, SE ϭ .033, t ϭ Ϫ3.53, p Ͻ .001. However, participants had longer regression path reading times on the postcritical region following a consistent critical word within a counterfactual context than a factual context, Est. ϭ Ϫ.072, SE ϭ .029, t ϭ Ϫ2.45, p Ͻ .05. Regression path reading times did not differ between factual and counterfactual contexts following an inconsistent critical word, Est. ϭ Ϫ.001, SE ϭ .03, t ϭ .04, p ϭ .97.
Total reading time. Statistical analyses revealed a significant effect of Consistency in the total time spent reading each region, indicating that participants spent longer reading the sentences when the critical word was inconsistent compared with when it was consistent with the wider context.
As in other measures, the effect of Context was significant in the precritical region, showing that participants spent longer reading this region when sentences were counterfactual compared with factual, because of length differences between context conditions. Total reading times on the critical word were also marginally longer in the ASD group than the TD group.
An interesting find was that as in first-pass and regression path reading times, the interaction between Context and Consistency was significant on this measure in the postcritical region. Follow-up analyses showed that the overall effect of consistency (inconsistent Ͼ consistent) was only significant within a factual context, Est. ϭ Ϫ.103, SE ϭ .02, t ϭ Ϫ5.13, p Ͻ .001, and not within a counterfactual context, Est. ϭ Ϫ.021, SE ϭ .022, t ϭ Ϫ.98, p ϭ .34. Participants did not differ in total time reading this region following a consistent critical word within a counterfactual or factual context, Est. ϭ Ϫ.025, SE ϭ .019, t ϭ Ϫ1.33, p ϭ .19, but spent more time reading when this postcritical region followed an in- This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
consistent word within a factual than a counterfactual context, Est. ϭ .06, SE ϭ .02, t ϭ 2.99, p Ͻ .01. Summary. Several important findings were revealed in Experiment 1. First, the consistency effect (inconsistent Ͼ consistent) on total reading times in all regions showed that overall, participants accommodated the hypothetical counterfactual world; they detected counterfactual inconsistencies in a comparable timecourse to factual inconsistencies. Second, factual inconsistencies elicited greater disruption to reading compared with counterfactual inconsistencies, as reflected by a larger consistency effect on the postcritical region in first-pass reading times, regression path reading times, and total reading times. Crucially, these patterns were manifest in both groups. Thus, when counterfactuals involve a minimal change from reality, counterfactual language processing is comparable in TD adults and adults with ASD. Nevertheless, some differences in processing emerged between the two groups. First, the ASD participants showed longer overall reading times on the critical word compared with the TD participants. More importantly, participants with ASD were quicker than TD participants at spotting anomalies across both types of contexts; they had longer first-pass and regression path reading times on inconsistent critical words than consistent critical words, a difference not found among the TD participants. We will return to this point in the General Discussion.
In summary, Experiment 1 provided evidence that high-functioning adults with ASD are able to process counterfactual sentences. However, these were simple counterfactual sentences where the implied factual world was based purely on a temporary discourse, resulting in a minimal change to reality. It may be that people with ASD have more difficulty with counterfactual reasoning when a more substantial change to reality is required. To test this in Experiment 2, participants read sentences that described hypothetical alternatives to known historical events (e.g., "If the Titanic had not hit an iceberg, it would have survived/sunk along with all the passengers"; adapted from Nieuwland & Martin, 2012) , where the critical word was consistent or inconsistent with the counterfactual context (but inconsistent/consistent with factual knowledge). Crucially, these counterfactuals required readers to suspend their knowledge of reality and imagine a novel version of the world. Thus, our central prediction in Experiment 2 was that participants with ASD would experience greater interference from their historical knowledge, and that this would disrupt or delay anomaly detection effects for an inconsistent critical word within a counterfactual context. This would be demonstrated by a reduced or delayed inconsistency effect within a counterfactual context for participants with ASD, relative to the TD participants.
Experiment 2 Method
Experiment 2 was run concurrently with Experiment 1. Therefore, methodology was as described in Experiment 1, bar the materials that are detailed below.
Materials. Sentences described known historical events, and were translated and modified from Nieuwland and Martin (2012) . Thirty-two experimental items were created in the same four conditions as Experiment 1, as in (2) As in Experiment 1, critical words were matched across conditions for length, frequency, and semantic relatedness with the preceding context, and no significant differences were found (all Fs Ͻ 1.8, ps Ͼ .18).
2 Cloze probability of experimental items was rated by 44 undergraduate students at the University of Kent, and sentence plausibility was rated by 42 different undergraduate students at the University of Kent. ANOVAs were conducted allowing generalization to items. As expected, cloze probability of consistent critical words (M ϭ 55%) was significantly higher than inconsistent critical words (M ϭ 1.2%, F(1, 31) ϭ 234.4, p Ͻ .001, This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. General knowledge assessment. Participants' general knowledge for the historical events described in Experiment 2 was assessed using a questionnaire. One question for each experimental item (e.g., "What happened in New York on September 11th 2001"?) was presented on a computer, and participants were instructed to type in a short answer, or write "I don't know." Participants were highly accurate, averaging 95% of questions answered correctly (SD ϭ 6.5%), and there was no significant difference in accuracy between the ASD (M ϭ 93%, SD ϭ 5.59) and TD groups (M ϭ 94%, SD ϭ 7.48), t(48) ϭ Ϫ0.49, p ϭ .629, d ϭ 0.15.
Results
Methods of analysis.
As in Experiment 1, stimuli were divided into three regions for analysis, with the consistent/inconsistent word always appearing midsentence:
Eye movement data was prepared and analyzed as in Experiment 1. The resulting reading items for each measure, region and condition are shown in Table 4 , and statistical effects are shown in Table 5 .
First-pass reading time. A significant effect of Context was found on first-pass reading time in all three regions, reflecting longer first-pass reading times for counterfactual compared with factual sentences. In the precritical region this is likely because of differences in length between counterfactual and factual contexts, whereas for the critical and postcritical regions this is likely to reflect additional early processing on the critical word within a counterfactual context. A significant Context ϫ Consistency ϫ Group interaction was found on the critical word region. Within a factual context, neither group showed a significant difference between consistent and inconsistent critical words (TD: Est. ϭ Ϫ.015, SE ϭ .017, t ϭ Ϫ.88, p ϭ .38; ASD: Est. ϭ Ϫ.032, SE ϭ .025, t ϭ Ϫ1.27, p ϭ .21). More important, within a counterfactual context TD participants showed a significant consistency effect on the critical word (inconsistent Ͼ consistent), Est. ϭ Ϫ.046, SE ϭ .017, t ϭ Ϫ2.67, p Ͻ .05, whereas participants with ASD did not, Est. ϭ .008, SE ϭ .025, t ϭ .32, p ϭ .75. In addition, first-pass reading times on the critical word were modulated by individual differences in Imagination, reflecting longer first-pass reading times in participants with higher imagination scores (Figure 2) .
Regression path reading time. Similar to first-pass reading times, there was a significant effect of Context on regression path reading times in the precritical and postcritical regions. This showed that participants took longer to move past these regions for counterfactual compared with factual sentences, and is likely to reflect length differences in the precritical region. The context 607 (394) 566 (353) 505 (292) 545 (360) 646 (330) 652 (346) 550 (293) 573 (351) Regression path reading time (ms)
701 (459) 721 (588) 575 (352) 622 (433) 707 (346) 731 (441) 612 (339) 649 (392) Total reading time (ms) 1,013 (577) 1,154 (860) 805 (548) 855 (567) 928 (502) 1,164 (760) 740 (389) 942 (626) Critical region First-pass reading time (ms)
247 (114) 241 (127) 252 (116) 266 (125) 218 (76) 248 (109) 250 (102) 261 (117) Regression path reading time (ms)
414 (494) 483 (538) 490 (602) 490 (513) 408 (424) 454 (510) 398 (384) 481 (600) Total reading time (ms)
383 (257) 398 (241) 405 (265) 468 (335) 327 (256) 397 (306) 333 (201) 412 (242) Postcritical region First-pass reading time (ms)
377 (257) 405 (296) 439 (347) 451 (369) 407 (262) 407 (279) 405 (268) 425 ( 599 (422) 674 (482) 598 (462) 689 (516) 530 (309) 595 (419) 506 (304) 627 (497) Note.
effect in the postcritical region, however, may additionally indicate slower integration of the counterfactual premise. More important, a significant effect of Consistency was found on the critical word region and the postcritical region. Participants took longer to move past these regions when the word was inconsistent with the preceding context compared with when it was consistent. In addition, regression path reading times on the critical word showed a positive correlation with participants' imagination scores.
Total reading time. A significant effect of Consistency was found in all three regions, with participants spending longer reading each region when the critical word was inconsistent compared with when it was consistent. In addition, a significant effect of Context was found in the precritical and critical regions, showing that participants spent longer overall reading the antecedent clause and critical word when it described a counterfactual version of the world as opposed to factual information.
There was a significant Consistency ϫ Group interaction in the precritical region. TD participants spent significantly longer reading this region when the sentence contained an inconsistent critical word compared with a consistent critical word, Est. ϭ Ϫ.084, SE ϭ .018, t ϭ Ϫ4.7, p Ͻ .001, but this difference missed significance in participants with ASD, Est. ϭ Ϫ.031, SE ϭ .018, t ϭ Ϫ1.74, p ϭ .09.
Total reading times on the critical word were significantly longer in the ASD group than the TD group, and people with higher imagination scores had longer total reading times on the critical and postcritical regions.
Summary. In Experiment 2, readers successfully used the counterfactual context to process incoming events according to an alternative version of the world (evidenced by the consistency effect on total reading times in all regions). An interesting find was that anomaly detection effects were comparable between factual and counterfactual contexts, suggesting that readers did not experience interference from the real world when processing the counterfactual sentences. Indeed, detection of the inconsistency emerged early in Experiment 2, with effects appearing on the critical word itself (in longer regression path reading times), suggesting that participants rapidly noticed the contextual inconsistency and responded by rereading prior text. Similar to Experiment 1, ASD participants showed longer total reading times on the critical word compared with the TD participants. Most important, adults with ASD were able to process nonreal counterfactual events in an equivalent timeframe to TD participants, although some subtle between-groups differences emerged in the way that counterfactual inconsistent words were responded to and recovered from (we discuss these subtle differences in the General Discussion). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
General Discussion
In two eye-tracking reading experiments, we sought to understand how individuals with ASD interpret counterfactual events online. In Experiment 1, items described counterfactual situations that modified the outcome of everyday events (e.g., If Joanne had remembered her umbrella, her hair would have been dry/wet). In Experiment 2, items set up hypothetical alternatives to known historical events (e.g., If the Titanic had not hit an iceberg it would have survived/sunk). While the counterfactual events in both experiments were logically true, sentences in Experiment 1 incurred a minimal change from reality (i.e., greater overlap between hypothetical and counterfactual worlds), but understanding in Experiment 2 required readers to suspend their knowledge of reality and imagine a novel version of the world.
Before discussing how the results inform our understanding of counterfactual processing in ASD, it is important to consider how the results relate to previous studies of counterfactual processing in neurotypical individuals. Overall, the patterns of performance shown by TD participants in each experiment replicate those from previous research in TD adults. In Experiment 1, where judgments about the consistency of critical words were based on constraints from the local discourse, TD readers elicited anomaly detection responses from the postcritical region, with increased regression path reading times on this region, and longer total reading times across the entire sentence. In addition, readers experienced some interference from the alternative model of the world, showing a reduced (or absent) consistency effect in a counterfactual, relative to factual, context on the postcritical region (across all three reading measures). In contrast, in Experiment 2, where counterfactual/factual worlds were more clearly distinct and understanding could be grounded in knowledge about reality, anomalies disrupted reading from the critical word itself, with longer regression path reading times on this region, and increased total reading times across the entire sentence. Here, readers did not show signs of conflict with the alternative world; the consistency effect was comparable within factual and counterfactual contexts. Therefore, in the TD group, anomaly detection effects appeared one region earlier in the sentence in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, and context (factual/counterfactual) did not influence anomaly detection in Experiment 2 as it did in Experiment 1. Anomaly detection on the critical word itself in Experiment 2 is likely because of the stimuli, which tapped real world knowledge and could be easily retrieved and updated from long-term memory. In contrast, stimuli in Experiment 1 manipulated discourse based anomalies, so required readers to generate new temporary representations of both factual and counterfactual worlds, which competed with each other in memory, and delayed anomaly detection responses to the postcritical region. Moreover, the timing with which counterfactual inconsistencies were detected between the two experiments replicates the timing effects seen in previous research (Ferguson, 2012; Ferguson & Cane, 2015; Nieuwland & Martin, 2012) . This shows that the different counterfactual constructions being tested (and the specific constraints they incur), rather than methodological differences between previous studies (i.e., eye-tracking vs. ERPs), can account for differences in the timecourse of counterfactual understanding (see Ferguson & Cane, 2015 for further discussion of paradigm sensitivity).
Regarding the key issue of counterfactual understanding in ASD, results from both experiments showed that adults with ASD do not experience gross difficulties understanding counterfactual sentences online; effects of consistency were clear in both groups. This extends findings from a recent eye-tracking reading study showing comparable lexical access in ASD and TD individuals (Howard, Liversedge, & Benson, 2017) . Intriguingly, however, between-groups differences emerged in the timecourse with which the counterfactuals were processed. In Experiment 1 participants with ASD detected factual and counterfactual inconsistencies even earlier than the TD group, with anomaly detection responses emerging in early reading measures on the critical word itself (on first-pass and regression path reading times). In Experiment 2, both TD and ASD readers showed anomaly detection responses upon encountering the critical word (on regression path time), though subtle differences emerged in the way the two groups responded to and recovered from these inconsistencies. Specifically, the TD group first spent longer first-pass reading inconsistent versus consistent critical words in a counterfactual context before regressing back to check the preceding context (reflected in increased regression path times on the critical word and increased total reading times on the precritical region). In contrast, participants with ASD did not show an inconsistency effect on first-pass reading times, but they rapidly regressed back to reread the critical word (reflected in increased total reading times on the critical word) and earlier parts of the sentence. The fact that the TD group, but not the ASD group, showed an anomaly effect on the "early" first-pass pass reading time measure may indicate a subtle timing advantage for anomaly detection in the TD group in Experiment 2, though both groups were clearly sensitive to the inconsistency upon first encountering the critical word. Nevertheless, both groups exhibited the same context modulations of anomaly detection (i.e., weaker effects of consistency for counterfactual than factual contexts in Experiment 1 but not Experiment 2), suggesting that TD and ASD participants experienced similar interference from reality.
The fact that in both experiments counterfactual inconsistencies were detected by participants with ASD in a comparable, or even enhanced, timecourse as TD participants is a novel finding, and contrasts with previous research that has shown impaired counterfac- Figure 2 . First pass reading times on the critical region, Experiment 2, for autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and typically developing (TD) participants in all conditions. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
tual reasoning in children with ASD (e.g., Grant, Riggs, & Boucher, 2004) . One potential explanation for this discrepancy is the developmental nature of the disorder; difficulties in childhood often abate in adulthood, with many symptoms of ASD improving throughout the life span (Shattuck et al., 2007) . Thus, it is possible that individuals with ASD simply experience a protracted period of developing fully functional counterfactual thinking, which extends beyond that of TD individuals (see Beck & Riggs, 2013 . Alternatively, the explicit, response-based methodologies used in previous studies may have driven response biases and errors (see Rubio-Fernández (2013) for a similar argument for Theory of Mind processing). For example, people with ASD are more susceptible to demand characteristics and so the syllogistic reasoning questions used in several previous studies (e.g., Leevers & Harris, 2000; Morsanyi & Handley, 2012; Scott et al., 1999) introduced ambiguity about what responses were desired by the experimenter. In contrast, the passive reading task and online eye movement measures used in the present study meant that counterfactual understanding was tested in real-time under relatively natural constraints, while limiting response biases. An interesting find was that these comparable anomaly detection responses were found despite the ASD group scoring significantly lower than the TD group on the imagination task, and marginally lower on our measure of inhibitory control, and when these measures were controlled for in our statistical analyses. These two cognitive skills are thought to be highly important for successful counterfactual reasoning. This suggests that although the adult ASD sample tested here were compromised on these skills relative to their TD peers (see also Adams & Jarrold, 2012; Williams & Jarrold, 2013) , they were sufficiently able to inhibit reality and imagine an appropriate alternative to interpret the logically valid counterfactuals tested here. What then do these results mean for theories of ASD that implicate impaired contextual integration? The weak central coherence theory (WCC) links a local processing bias with a lack of global coherence in ASD (Frith, 1989; Frith & Happé, 1994; Happé & Frith, 2006) , which would predict that individuals with ASD would be impaired at integrating information within and between sentences (and, thus, miss anomalies). Another cognitive account, the theory of complex information processing (CIP; Minshew & Goldstein, 1998; Minshew, Goldstein, & Siegel, 1997; Minshew, Williams, & McFadden, 2008) proposes that ASD is the result of an impairment in the "complex" processes that facilitate information integration or the use of top-down knowledge. Our results suggest that participants with ASD spontaneously maintained global coherence across the entire sentence, showing appropriate anomaly detection responses based on discourse in Experiment 1, and based on a counterfactual premise that modified reality in Experiment 2. Indeed, the fact that discourse-based anomalies in Experiment 1 were detected even faster by participants with ASD than TD participants, suggests superior integration skills. These results are consistent with the findings from Au-Yeung, Kaakinen, Liversedge, and Benson's (2015) eye-tracking reading study, where participants with ASD showed no difficulty utilizing the global discourse context to interpret a sentence as ironic (or not). However, it is important to note that the distinction between local/global and simple/ complex contexts is currently undefined in the WCC and CIP theories, making it possible that adults with ASD are able to maintain global coherence within a single sentence. Further studies are needed to test how people with ASD interpret counterfactual events when the counterfactual world needs to be maintained over time (i.e., over multiple clauses and sentences), or when the discourse switches between factual and counterfactual versions of the world (as in Ferguson & Cane, 2015) .
In conclusion, the two experiments reported here suggest that counterfactual understanding is undiminished in adults with ASD. Participants with ASD rapidly accommodated the hypothetical counterfactual world, and successfully detected contextually inconsistent events within factual and counterfactual contexts, in a comparable timecourse to TD participants. In fact, participants with ASD were faster than TD participants to detect anomalies within realistic, discourse-based counterfactuals, and detection was comparable when understanding could be grounded in knowledge about reality. Both groups experienced interference from the alternative "world" when overlap between worlds was high (as in Experiment 1), but not when the two worlds were more clearly distinct (as in Experiment 2). These data demonstrate that people with ASD employ subtly different processing strategies for counterfactual thinking, and argue against general difficulties in global coherence and complex integration.
1. If Joanne had remembered her umbrella, her hair would have been dry when she arrived home.
If Joanne had remembered her umbrella, her hair would have been wet when she arrived home.
Because Joanne had remembered her umbrella, her hair had been dry when she arrived home.
Because Joanne had remembered her umbrella, her hair had been wet when she arrived home.
2. If the racing driver had won the championship, he would have gone to the pub to celebrate with his team.
If the racing driver had won the championship, he would have gone to the pub to commiserate with his team.
Because the racing driver had won the championship, he had gone to the pub to celebrate with his team.
Because the racing driver had won the championship, he had gone to the pub to commiserate with his team.
3. If David had been wearing his glasses, he would have found that the words were clear on the poster.
If David had been wearing his glasses, he would have found that the words were blurry on the poster.
Because David had been wearing his glasses, he had found that the words were clear on the poster.
Because David had been wearing his glasses, he had found that the words were blurry on the poster.
4. If Alice had not got stuck in a traffic jam driving home, she would have arrived home on time that evening.
If Alice had not got stuck in a traffic jam driving home, she would have arrived home late that evening.
Because Alice had got stuck in a traffic jam driving home, she had arrived home late that evening.
Because Alice had got stuck in a traffic jam driving home, she had arrived home on time that evening.
(Appendix continues)
5. If Catherine had worn a coat in the rain, her dress would have been dry when she arrived at work.
If Catherine had worn a coat in the rain, her dress would have been soaked when she arrived at work.
Because Catherine had worn a coat in the rain, her dress had been dry when she arrived at work.
Because Catherine had worn a coat in the rain, her dress had been soaked when she arrived at work.
6. If David had eaten a large lunch, his stomach would have been full that afternoon.
If David had eaten a large lunch, his stomach would have been empty that afternoon.
Because David had eaten a large lunch, his stomach had been full that afternoon.
Because David had eaten a large lunch, his stomach had been empty that afternoon.
7. If Sylvia had worn thick socks in the snow, her feet would have been warm inside her boots.
If Sylvia had worn thick socks in the snow, her feet would have been cold inside her boots.
Because Sylvia had worn thick socks in the snow, her feet had been warm inside her boots.
Because Sylvia had worn thick socks in the snow, her feet had been cold inside her boots.
8. If Hannah had fixed her freezer, when she checked the ice trays the water would have been frozen that evening.
If Hannah had fixed her freezer, when she checked the ice trays the water would have been liquid that evening.
Because Hannah had fixed her freezer, when she checked the ice trays the water had been frozen that evening.
Because Hannah had fixed her freezer, when she checked the ice trays the water had been liquid that evening.
9. If Jacob had felt confident with his looks, whenever he looked in the mirror he would have thought he looked good for his age.
If Jacob had felt confident with his looks, whenever he looked in the mirror he would have thought he looked bad for his age.
Because Jacob had felt confident with his looks, whenever he looked in the mirror, he had thought he looked good for his age.
Because Jacob had felt confident with his looks, whenever he looked in the mirror, he had thought he looked bad for his age.
10. If Fred had seen the looming dark clouds, he would have prepared himself for rain as he got dressed.
If Fred had seen the looming dark clouds, he would have prepared himself for sunshine as he got dressed.
Because Fred had seen the looming dark clouds, he had prepared himself for rain as he got dressed.
Because Fred had seen the looming dark clouds, he had prepared himself for sunshine as he got dressed.
11. If Tim's team had correctly answered the most questions in the pub quiz, they would have won the top prize.
If Tim's team had correctly answered the most questions in the pub quiz, they would have lost the top prize.
Because Tim's team had correctly answered the most questions in the pub quiz, they had won the top prize.
Because Tim's team had correctly answered the most questions in the pub quiz, they had lost the top prize.
12. If John's mother had cooked him an enormous roast dinner, he would have felt very full as he watched TV.
If John's mother had cooked him an enormous roast dinner, he would have felt very hungry as he watched TV.
Because John's mother had cooked him an enormous roast dinner, he had felt very full as he watched TV.
Because John's mother had cooked him an enormous roast dinner, he had felt very hungry as he watched TV.
13. If Andy had understood everything in the statistics lecture, he would have found his homework very easy to complete correctly.
If Andy had understood everything in the statistics lecture, he would have found his homework very difficult to complete correctly.
Because Andy had understood everything in the statistics lecture, he had found his homework very easy to complete correctly.
Because Andy had understood everything in the statistics lecture, he had found his homework very difficult to complete correctly.
14. If Jill had not put her ice lolly back in the freezer before she answered the door, it would have been melted when she returned to it.
If Jill had not put her ice lolly back in the freezer before she answered the door, it would have been frozen when she returned to it.
Because Jill had put her ice lolly back in the freezer before she answered the door, it had been frozen when she returned to it.
Because Jill had put her ice lolly back in the freezer before she answered the door, it had been melted when she returned to it.
15. If Guy's debate team had made a successful argument, the compere would have announced them as the winners of the big debate.
If Guy's debate team had made a successful argument, the compere would have announced them as the losers of the big debate.
Because Guy's debate team had made a successful argument, the compere had announced them as the winners of the big debate.
Because Guy's debate team had made a successful argument, the compere had announced them as losers of the big debate.
16. If Liz had stuck to the weight watchers plan, she would have noticed that her clothes were feeling loose after two weeks.
If Liz had stuck to the weight watchers plan, she would have noticed that her clothes were feeling tight after two weeks.
Because Liz had stuck to the weight watchers plan, she had noticed that her clothes were feeling loose after two weeks.
Because Liz had stuck to the weight watchers plan, she had noticed that her clothes were feeling tight after two weeks.
17. If the central heating system had not broken down, the housemates would have found the house was warm in the morning.
If the central heating system had not broken down, the housemates would have found the house was cold in the morning.
Because the central heating system had broken down, the housemates had found the house was cold in the morning.
Because the central heating system had broken down, the housemates had found the house was warm in the morning.
18. If Lee had worked out at the gym after work and felt tired, he would have decided to go to bed early that evening.
If Lee had worked out at the gym after work and felt tired, he would have decided to go to bed late that evening.
Because Lee had worked out at the gym after work and felt tired, he had decided to go to bed early that evening.
Because Lee had worked out at the gym after work and felt tired, he had decided to go to bed late that evening.
19. If Maria had not lost her case, she would have left the courtroom feeling happy about the outcome.
If Maria had not lost her case, she would have left the courtroom feeling upset about the outcome.
Because Maria had lost her case, she had left the courtroom feeling upset about the outcome.
Because Maria had lost her case, she had left the courtroom feeling happy about the outcome.
20. If the comedian had thoroughly prepared his act, his audience would have left feeling happy at the end.
If the comedian had thoroughly prepared his act, his audience would have left feeling disappointed at the end.
Because the comedian had thoroughly prepared his act, his audience had left feeling happy at the end.
Because the comedian had thoroughly prepared his act, his audience had left feeling disappointed at the end.
21. If Alison had not got very drunk at the party, she would have woken up feeling refreshed the next day.
If Alison had not got very drunk at the party, she would have woken up feeling hungover the next day.
Because Alison had got very drunk at the party, she had woken up feeling hungover the next day.
Because Alison had got very drunk at the party, she had woken up feeling refreshed the next day.
22. If Inez' grandchildren had not knocked over the antique vase, it would have been intact when her guests arrived.
If Inez' grandchildren had not knocked over the antique vase, it would have been broken when her guests arrived.
Because Inez' grandchildren had knocked over the antique vase, it had been broken when her guests arrived.
Because Inez' grandchildren had knocked over the antique vase, it had been intact when her guests arrived.
23. If Charlie and his wife had not been arguing, they would have eaten dinner together happily at the table.
If Charlie and his wife had not been arguing, they would have eaten dinner together in silence at the table.
Because Charlie and his wife had been arguing, they had eaten together in silence at the table.
Because Charlie and his wife had been arguing, they had eaten together happily at the table.
24. If Stephen had not done well in his first year at University, he would have been disappointed with the results.
If Stephen had not done well in his first year at University, he would have been happy with the results.
Because Stephen had done well in his first year at University, he had been happy with his results.
Because Stephen had done well in his first year at University, he had been disappointed with his results.
25. If Jessica had not enjoyed science, the day she spent visiting the science museum would have felt too long for her.
If Jessica had not enjoyed science, the day she spent visiting the science museum would have felt too short for her.
Because Jessica enjoyed science, the day she spent visiting the science museum had felt too short for her.
Because Jessica enjoyed science, the day she spent visiting the science museum had felt too long for her.
26. If Elaine's car had not passed its MOT, it would have been deemed dangerous to drive on the roads.
If Elaine's car had not passed its MOT, it would have been deemed safe to drive on the roads.
Because Elaine's car had passed its MOT, it had been deemed safe to be driven on the roads.
Because Elaine's car had passed its MOT, it had been deemed dangerous to be driven on the roads.
27. If John had not hurt his back, when he woke up in the morning, it would have felt fine all over.
If John had not hurt his back, when he woke up in the morning, it would have felt stiff all over.
Because John had hurt his back, when he woke up in the morning, it had felt stiff all over.
Because John had hurt his back, when he woke up in the morning, it had felt fine all over.
28. If the earthquake had not caused a radioactive isotope to leak from the nuclear plant, the air would have been clean the next day.
If the earthquake had not caused a radioactive isotope to leak from the nuclear plant, the air would have been contaminated the next day.
Because the earthquake had caused a radioactive isotope to leak from the nuclear plant, the air had been contaminated the next day.
Because the earthquake had caused a radioactive isotope to leak from the nuclear plant, the air had been clean the next day.
29. If Greg had not remembered his asthma inhaler at the football game, his breathing would have been erratic at half time.
If Greg had not remembered his asthma inhaler at the football game, his breathing would have been fine at half time.
Because Greg had remembered his asthma inhaler at the football game, his breathing had been fine at half time.
17. If waste produced from nuclear energy did not emit radiation, it would be safe for us.
If waste produced from nuclear energy did not emit radiation, it would be dangerous for us.
Because waste produced from nuclear energy emits radiation, it is dangerous for us.
Because waste produced from nuclear energy emits radiation, it is safe for us.
18. If cars had not been invented, we would get to places a lot slower in most cases.
If cars had not been invented, we would get to places a lot faster in most cases.
Because cars were invented, we get to places a lot faster in most cases.
Because cars were invented, we get to places a lot slower in most cases.
19. If the mp3 format had not been invented, CD sales would be higher in retail outlets.
If the mp3 format had not been invented, CD sales would be lower in retail outlets.
Because the mp3 format was invented, CD sales are lower in retail outlets.
Because the mp3 format was invented, CD sales are higher in retail outlets.
20. If there wasn't a limit to how much alcohol you could drink before driving, traveling on the roads would be riskier on average.
If there wasn't a limit to how much alcohol you could drink before driving, traveling on the roads would be safer on average.
Because there is a limit to how much alcohol you can drink before driving, traveling on the roads is safer on average.
Because there is a limit to how much alcohol you can drink before driving, traveling on the roads is riskier on average.
21. If glasses had not been invented, many people would have vision that is worse as a result.
If glasses had not been invented, many people would have vision that is better as a result.
Because glasses were invented, many people have vision that is better as a result.
Because glasses were invented, many people have vision that is worse as a result.
22. If there were no anti-smoking laws, smoking would be permitted in most workplaces.
If there were no anti-smoking laws, smoking would be forbidden in most workplaces.
Because there are anti-smoking laws, smoking is forbidden in most workplaces.
Because there are anti-smoking laws, smoking is permitted in most workplaces.
23. If dogs had never been tamed, they would be considered wild nowadays.
If dogs had never been tamed, they would be considered domesticated nowadays.
Because dogs have been tamed, they are considered domesticated nowadays.
Because dogs have been tamed, they are considered wild nowadays.
24. If the Channel Tunnel had not been built, the journey between London and Paris would be longer for travelers.
If the Channel Tunnel had not been built, the journey between London and Paris would be shorter for travelers.
Because the Channel Tunnel was built, the journey between London and Paris is shorter for travelers.
Because the Channel Tunnel was built, the journey between London and Paris is longer for travelers.
25. If the Berlin wall had not been pulled down, Germany would be a divided country in Europe.
If the Berlin wall had not been pulled down, Germany would be a united country in Europe.
Because the Berlin wall was pulled down, Germany is a united country in Europe.
Because the Berlin wall was pulled down, Germany is a divided country in Europe.
26. If Al 'Qaeda had not carried out the attacks on September 11th, the twin towers would be standing in New York City.
If Al 'Qaeda had not carried out the attacks on September 11th, the twin towers would be destroyed in New York City.
Because Al 'Qaeda carried out the attacks on September 11th, the twin towers are destroyed in New York City.
Because Al 'Qaeda carried out the attacks on September 11th, the twin towers are standing in New York City.
